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I. INTRODUCTION
Many businesses rely on the health of the environment to sell goods
and services to their customers. Coastal resorts need pristine beaches for
their patrons; golf courses need manicured lawns and beautiful
surroundings to increase their customers' pleasure; fisheries need
ecologically healthy aquatic environments to support fish; and hunting
lodges require fertile lands to support the wild game their customers will
hunt. When the environment that a business relies on starts to degrade, they
can see their profits endangered. Businesses along the Great Lakes are
facing such a danger from harmful algal blooms. This Note seeks to provide
suggestions on why algal blooms have become such a danger to Great
Lakes businesses' commercial interests and what possible legal remedies
are available to these businesses that are at risk of seeing their profits
reduced or eliminated. This Note's inquiry is novel for studying the
possible legal remedies available to Great Lakes businesses threatened by
harmful algal blooms.
The Great Lakes are collectively the largest source of fresh water
on Earth and also one of the most important sources of economic wealth in
the United States.' The Great Lakes region "account[s] for 33% of the
nation's population, 32% of its GDP, 30% of its merchandise exports, and
28% of its patents, even in the face of a significant re-ordering of the
world's economy."2 For Lake Erie alone, tourism generates $10.7 billion
annually. 3 "Regional tourism also supports more than 100,000 northern
Ohio jobs and generates $750 million in state and local taxes.' 4
* Juris Doctor Candidate, 2015, The Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz
College of Law.
1 ANN ARBOR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ET AL., AN AGENDA FOR JOBS AND
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION 2 (2013).2 Id. at 3.
3 GREAT LAKES COMM'N, GREAT LAKES RESTORATION AT WORK IN OHIO 1 (2013).
hid.
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Number of Jobs Related to the Great Lakes by State5
STATE GREAT LAKES JOBS
Minnesota 11,877
Wisconsin 173,969
Illinois 380,786
Indiana 54,397
Michigan 525,886
Ohio 178,621
Pennsylvania 25,479
New York 157,547
Total 1.51 Million
Number of Jobs Related to the Great Lakes by Industry
6
INDUSTRY GREAT LAKES JOBS
Manufacturing 994,879
Tourism and Recreation 217,635
Shipping 118,550
Agriculture 118,430
Science and Engineering 38,085
Utilities 10,980
Mining 10,003
Total 1.51 Million
One thing that has gotten the attention of policy makers in the last
few years has been the algal bloom crisis affecting much of the Great
Lakes. Lake Erie had its worst year for algal blooms in 2011, 7 and it has not
abated much since then. Algal blooms are no stranger to coastlines of the
5 LYNN VACCARO & JENNIFER READ, VITAL TO OUR NATION'S ECONOMY: GREAT
LAKES JOBS 3 tbl.1 (2011).
6 id
.
7 INT'L JOINT COMM'N, LAKE ERIE ECOsYSTEM PRIORITY: DRAFT SUMMARY
REPORT ii (2013).
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Great Lakes, but the problem has become more pronounced in recent years
due to a variety of factors. Harmful algal blooms (HAB or HABs) are
known to cause a variety of problems, including: "human illness and
mortality following consumption of or indirect exposure to HAB toxins,
substantial economic losses to coastal communities and commercial
fisheries, and HAB-associated fish, bird and mammal mortalities.,
8
The economic losses posed by HABs can potentially be very steep.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) estimated
that HABs caused $38 million a year in losses to commercial fisheries; $37
million a year in public health costs; $4 million a year in lost recreation and
tourism spending; and $3 million worth of expenses in financing coastal
monitoring and management. 9
Another nationwide estimate of the average annual costs of HABs
is approximately $50 million. l Public health was the largest component at
roughly $20 million annually.'" Commercial fisheries suffered an average
of $18 million annually. 12 Recreation and tourism were adversely affected
by at least $7 million, and monitoring and management had $2 million in
costs. 13
Given these negative consequences for an important economic
engine like the Great Lakes, academics, environmentalists and politicians
are looking for ways to stem the consequences of algal blooms. This Note
analyzes what possible legal measures are available to Great Lakes
businesses in response to the economic danger posed by HABs. Part II
gives a brief summary of the science and causes behind HABs.
Furthermore, Part II provides a description of the broad economic impact
that HABs have on coastal economies. Part II then describes the
international and national government institutions involved in managing the
Great Lakes' ecological health. Part III describes two possible non-
exclusive solutions available to Great Lakes businesses: private rights of
action under the Clean Water Act and lobbying government leaders to
implement sensible environmental standards. This Note proposes that while
litigation is suitable in some circumstances, the best long-term solution to
the HABs crisis is lobbying by Great Lakes businesses.
8 Harmful Algae, WOODS HOLE OCEANOGRAPHIC INST.,
http://www.whoi.edu/redtide/home (last updated May 15, 2013).
9 NAT'L CTRS. FOR COASTAL OCEAN SCIENCE, NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN., ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF HARMFUL ALGAL BLOOMS (2012).
1o Economic Impacts, WOODS HOLE OCEANOGRAPHIC INST.,
http://www.whoi.edu/redtide/page.do?pid= 15315 (last updated July 31, 2012).
" Id.12 Id.
13 Id.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. What HABs Are and Why They Are Bad for Great Lakes
Businesses
"Algae are photosynthetic organisms that occur in most habitats,"
1 4
including fresh water environments like the Great Lakes. 15 Algae are
important to aquatic ecosystems and often form the base of the food chain.'
6
Furthermore, algae produce oxygen that is necessary for the survival of
other aquatic organisms.' 7 Therefore, it is important that some minimal
level of algae be present to protect the ecological health of the Great Lakes.
Algae can become dangerous to aquatic organisms; if algae become
too numerous, they can create algal blooms.' 8 Blue-green algae, the most
common kind of algae in the Great Lakes, produce toxins that in large
amounts kill aquatic species that come into contact with it. 19 Ingestion of
blue-green algae by humans also causes very harmful physical symptoms.
20
Physical symptoms include "muscle cramps, twitching, paralysis, and
cardiac or respiratory failure ... nausea, vomiting, and acute liver failure..
• skin irritation, rashes, and gastrointestinal distress."'', Therefore, HABs
can have a severe impact on the health of aquatic species and humans who
make contact with them.
Beyond the toxic effects, another danger posed by HABs occurs
after algae die. When algae die, the decomposition process consumes
oxygen in the water-oxygen that would otherwise be consumed by aquatic
species.22 "Depletion of oxygen through decomposition of organic material
is known as biochemical oxygen demand (BOD).,23 "As the BOD load
14 Algae Research: Introduction, SMITHSONIAN NAT'L MUSEUM OF NAT. HIST.,
http://botany.si.edu/projects/algae/introduction.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
15 NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., HARMFUL ALGAL BLOOMS IN THE
GREAT LAKES,
http://www.glerl.noaa.gov/pubs/brochures/bluegreenalgae_factsheet.pdf (last
visited Apr. 17, 2014).
16 Algae Research. Introduction, supra note 14.
17id.
18 NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 15.
19Id.
20id
21 Id.
22 See Algal Bloom, SCIENCEDAILY,
http://www.sciencedaily.com/articles/a/algal-bloom.htm (last visited Apr. 17,
2014).
23 PHOSPHORUS REDUCTION TASK FORCE, PRIORITIES FOR REDUCING PHOSPHORUS
LOADINGS AND ABATING ALGAL BLOOMS IN THE GREAT LAKES - ST. LAWRENCE
RIVER BASIN: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR IMPROVING GREAT LAKES
AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS 2 (2012).
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increases and oxygen levels drop, certain species of fish can be killed. 4
This condition of zero or very low oxygen levels is known as hypoxia. 5
The Lake Erie Central Dead Zone is a major example of the kind of
effects large HABs can cause in an aquatic ecosystem. 26 The central basin is
located from about Huron, Ohio to Erie, Pennsylvania. 7 The Dead Zone's
bottom layer is a layer of cold water cut off from the air.28 Consequently,
most aquatic species die as a result of the decreased oxygen levels, and
other species move in.29
B. What Causes HABs?
There are many causes of HABs. Sewage drainage, agricultural
runoff and warming temperatures are linked to HABs. 30 Excessive nutrient
loadings primarily cause HABs as a result of human activities.31 In the past,
nutrients entered the Great Lakes from "two main sources: human waste
discharge and agriculture runoff., 32 Phosphorus is the principal ingredient
causing the HABs. 3 Much of the phosphorus that makes its way into the
Great Lakes comes from agricultural runoff containing phosphorus based
fertilizers. 34 Phosphorus-based fertilizers come in three major types:
commercial phosphorus fertilizers; biosolid fertilizers; and manure-based
phosphorus fertilizers.35
Plants use phosphorus "to produce a strong root system, increase
the growth rate and promote flower development., 36 Phosphorus occurs
naturally and comes in two types: particulate phosphorus 37 (i.e., phosphorus
that is attached or absorbed to soil particles or other matter) and dissolved
or soluble reactive phosphorus.38 Of the two types of phosphorus, dissolved
24 id.
25 INT'L JOINT COMM'N, supra note 7, at vii.
26 Great Lakes: Lakewide Management Plans, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/greatlakes/lakeerie/eriedeadzone.html (last updated July 2,
2012).27 id.
28 Id.
29 PHOSPHORUS REDUCTION TASK FORCE, supra note 23, at 2.3 0 See generally id.
3 Id. at 1.
32 id.
33 See Algal Bloom, supra note 22.
34 See generally id.
35 OHIO ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OHIO LAKE ERIE PHOSPHORUS TASK FORCE FINAL
REPORT 37 (2010).
36 PHOSPHORUS REDUCTION TASK FORCE, supra note 23, at 2.3 7 NAT'L CTR. FOR WATER QUALITY RESEARCH, HEIDELBERG UNIV., DISSOLVED
PHOSPHORUS FROM CROPLAND RUNOFF: WHY IT IS A BIG PROBLEM! (2011),
(describing particulate phosphorus as "[p]hosphorus that remains on the filter with
the particulate matter").
38 Id. (describing dissolved phosphorus as "the phosphorus that remains in water
after that water has been filtered to remove particulate matter").
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phosphorus causes the principal problem because of its special
characteristics compared to particulate phosphorus.39 Dissolved phosphorus
is roughly three times more capable of supporting algal growth than
particulate phosphorus, which makes it a much bigger problem.
40
C. The Effects HABs Have on Local Businesses
Many different industries heavily rely on the Great Lakes being
ecologically healthy. Manufacturing, tourism and recreation, utilities,
public health institutions, drinking water and real estate industries rely on
the vitality of the Great Lakes. 41 HABs threaten to cause millions of dollars
in aggregate damage to these industries.42
In an exhaustive study of the economic costs associated with
HABs, researchers found support for the general consensus that HABs have
the potential to cost coastal communities tens of millions of dollars.43 The
study found that HABs were associated with an increased cost of public
health expenditures. 44 Between 1987 and 1992, HABs caused between $18
million and $25 million per year in increased public health expenditures. 45
This averages out to roughly $22 million annually.46
Commercial fishing also took a toll from HABs. 4 7 Using
conservative estimates, the study found that between $13 million and $25
million were lost due to HABs negatively affecting commercial fishing
businesses.48 Considering that the Great Lakes fishing industry is such a
39 id.
Dissolved P is a special problem because (1) it is highly
"bioavailable" to algae, i.e. it supports rapid algal growth and
reproduction, (2) the amounts or loads of dissolved P entering
Lake Erie have been increasing dramatically in recent years, and
(3) dissolved P remains in the water while particulate P settles to
stream and lake bottoms where it may no longer be available to
algae.
Id.
40 Id. ("About 95% of dissolved P is bioavailable to algae while only about 30% of
the particulate P attached to eroded sediment is bioavailable.").
41 VACCARO & READ, supra note 5.42 See DONALD M. ANDERSON ET AL., WOODS HOLE OCEANOGRAPHIC INST.,
ESTIMATED ANNUAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS FROM HARMFUL ALGAL BLOOMS
ABS) IN THE UNITED STATES 52 (2000).
3 Id.
44 Id. at 5.
45 Id.
46Id.
47 Id.
48 id.
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major source of income, the threat posed by HABs could become
depressing on the regional economy. 9
The effect that HABs have on recreation and tourism was hard to
measure because of a lack of data, according to the previously mentioned
study.50 However, using case studies from numerous states, the study
conservatively estimated that the maximum damage caused by HABs to the
tourism industry was approximately $29 million. 5' The study also
concluded that the real estate industry likely suffered annual economic loss
due to HABs, but that no data set existed to track this kind of data.52 The
chart below shows the low to high estimates of the economic damage that
HABs have caused.
Estimated Annual Economic Impacts
from Harmful Algal Blooms (HABs) in the United States
(Estimate is of 1987-1992 period, reported in 2000 dollars) 53
Low High Average Total
Public Health $18,493,825 $ 24,912,544 $ 22,202,597 45%
Commercial Fishery $13,400,691 $ 25,265,896 $ 18,407,948 37%
Recreation/Tourism $ - $29,304,357 $6,630,415 13%
Monitoring/Management $ 2,029,955 $ 2,124,307 $ 2,088,885 4%
TOTAL $33,924,471 $81,607,104 $49,329,845 100%
15 Year Capitalized $308,981,162 $743,270,485 $449,291,987
Impacts (discounted at
7%)
Case studies have shown that HABs have caused other coastal
economies millions of dollars in damage. 4 One case of HABs causing large
economic damage occurred in Grand Lake St. Marys (GLSM).5 "GLSM is
Ohio's largest inland lake" at roughly twenty-one square miles, and it is the
main source of drinking water for the residents living in and around the
town of Celina, Ohio. 6 Furthermore, GLSM provided an estimated $240
million in annual revenue for Celina and surrounding communities from
49 See The Great Lakes and Fishing, MICH. CHARTER BOAT ASS'N,
http://www.michigancharterboats.com/greatlakes.html (last visited April 12, 2014)
"Great Lakes fisheries are valued at more than $4 billion annually.").
0 ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 6 ("Although many experts argue that the
impacts of HABs on recreation and tourism are important and potentially large,
there are few available data describing the size of the impacts.").
5 d. at6.52 Id. at 54.
53 Id. at 52 tbl.7.1.54 See, e.g., Tom Davenport & Wendy Drake, Grand Lake St. Marys, Ohio - The
Case for Source Water Protection: Nutrients and Algae Blooms, LAKELINE MAG.,
Fall 2011, at 42-45.
55 Id. at 42
56 id.
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fishing, boating and swimming.57 In 2010, GLSM was measured to have
four times the level of microcystis than the level that is safe for human
consumption, resulting in GLSM being closed 8 In 2010, the closure of
GLSM decreased annual revenue in the region by roughly forty percent 59 or
$60 million.60 It was later found that runoff from phosphorus-based
fertilizers was the biggest causes of the HABs in GLSM.6'
In another case occurring between 2002 and 2003, HABs disrupted
the local clam fishing market in the Pacific Northwest for a whole year.62
The algae in that case caused normally edible clams, oysters and Dungeness
crabs to become poisonous to human consumption, resulting in an annual
loss of between $10 million and $12 million (or roughly fourteen to
seventeen percent of the typical annual revenue).63 The oyster, Dungeness
crab and razor clam fisheries in Washington are valued at roughly $72
million a year for the local economies, and are important for "commerce,
[and] recreation.' '64
In New England in 2005, HABs caused major disruptions to the
shellfish industry.65 Many shellfish were infected and made poisonous by a
condition known as paralytic shellfish poisoning (PSP). 66 HABs caused an
estimated $23 million in potential shellfish losses in 2005 alone.67 Tens of
millions of dollars of potential shellfish continue to be lost annually by
local fisheries.68 These costs also do not take account of indirect costs
associated with "business[es] linked to the shellfish industry" in New
England.69
57 JOE LOGAN, GREAT LAKES LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS, NUTRIENT LOADING IN OHIO:
SERIOUS CHALLENGES FOR CRITICAL NATURAL RESOURCES 14 (2013).
58 Davenport & Drake, supra note 54, at 43. The World Health Organization
specifies less than 20 parts per billion is the threshold of microcystis that is safe for
human contact; GLSM had "four times" that level of microcystis. Id. Microcystis is
the technical name for blue-green algae. For a more precise definition, see OFF. OF
ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, STATE OF CAL., MICROCYSTIS: TOXIC
BLUE-GREEN ALGAE (2008) ("Microcystis aeruginosa is a single-celled blue green
alga, or cyanobacterium, that occurs naturally in surface waters.").
59 See Press Release, Off. of the Governor, State of Ohio, SBA Approves
Governor's Request for Assistance for Grand Lake St. Marys Businesses (Oct. 20,
2010).
60 See Davenport & Drake, supra note 54, at 43 (listing $150 million as the pre-
closure amount of "annual economic activity").
61 Id. ("Nutrient loadings from tributaries, (particularly phosphorus) are exerting
the most negative impact on the lake. Phosphorus levels during runoff events were
then (and still are) among the consistently highest levels in the state.").
62 NAT'L CTRS. FOR COASTAL OCEAN SCI., supra note 9.63 Id.
64 id
65 id.
66 id.
67 id.
68 Id. (describing the continued closure of certain fisheries in the area).
69 id.
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HAB outbreaks on Florida's west coast annually cost tens of
millions of dollars in lost revenue.70 The HABs in this case "kill fish, [and]
birds" and "are a threat to human health.",7' Between $19 million and $32
million dollars in annual damage to Florida's economy is caused by these
HABs.72 Furthermore, a severe outbreak in the early 1970s caused roughly
$20 million in economic loss ($100 million in 2007 dollars), mostly to the
tourism industry.73
D. Management of the Great Lakes Is Divided Between International,
National and State Authorities
1. International Organizations Play an Important, Albeit,
Purely Supportive Role in Managing the Great Lakes
The Great Lakes Commission (Commission) is an international
organization composed of eight states and two Canadian provinces (Ottawa
and Quebec).74 The Great Lakes Compact Treaty (the Compact) created the
Commission to facilitate cooperation and communication between various
American states and Canadian provinces.75 The Compact lists the goals of
the Commission in Article I of the Compact.76 Specifically, the Compact
states the goals of the Commission as:
1. To promote the orderly, integrated, and comprehensive
development, use, and conservation of the water sources of
the Great Lakes Basin (hereinafter called the Basin).
2. To plan for the welfare and development of the water
resources of the Basin as a whole as well as for those
portions of the Basin which may have problems of special
concern.
3. To make it possible for the states of the Basin and their
people to derive the maximum benefit from utilization of
public works, in the form of navigational aids or otherwise,
which may exist or which may be constructed from time to
time.
4. To advise in securing and maintaining a proper balance
among industrial, commercial, agricultural, water supply,
residential, recreational, and other legitimate uses of the
water resources of the Basin.
70 id.
71lid.
72 id.
73 id.
74 Great Lakes Basin Compact art. II, U.S.-Can., July 24, 1968, 82 Stat. 414.
71 Id. at art. I(5).
76 See generally id. at art. 1.
242 THE OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 9.1
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
5. To establish and maintain an intergovernmental agency
to the end that the purposes of this compact may be
accomplished more effectively.77
However, the Commission suffers from a lack of authority to
implement any binding policy meant to preserve the Great Lakes. 8 In
Article VI of the Compact, the powers of the Commission are limited to
conducting and synthesizing research, making recommendations on
changes to laws and policies of member states and communicating between
concerned agencies. 79 Because of the limited nature of its ability to
implement binding policies, the Commission's role is strictly an advisory
one in the management of the Great Lakes.80 According to the Compact, the
Commission has the power to:
(A.) Collect, correlate, interpret, and report on data relating
to the water resources and the use thereof in the Basin or
any portion thereof[;] (B.) [r]ecommend methods for the
orderly, efficient, and balanced development, use and
conservation of the water resources of the Basin or any
portion thereof to the party states and to any other
governments or agencies having interests in or jurisdiction
over the Basin or any portion thereofi;] . . . [and] (F.)
[r]ecommend policies relating to water resources including
the institution and alteration of flood plain and other zoning
laws, ordinances and regulations.
8
'
77 Id.
78 See generally id. at art. VI(K)-(M).
79 See generally id. at art. VI.
80 Act Granting the Consent of Congress to a Great Lakes Basin Compact, and for
Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 90-419, § 2, 82 Stat. 414, 419 (1968).81 Great Lakes Basin Compact art. VI(A), (B), (F), U.S.-Can., July 24, 1968, 82
Stat. 414. Other powers include the abilities to:
C. Consider the need for and desirability of public works and
improvements relating to the water resources[;] ... H. Consider
and recommend amendments or agreements supplementary to
this compact to the party states or any of them, and assist in the
formulation and drafting of such amendments or supplementary
agreements[;] I. Prepare and publish reports, bulletins, and
publications appropriate to this work and fix reasonable sale
prices therefore[;] J. With respect to the water resources of the
Basin or any portion thereof, recommend agreements between
the governments of the United States and Canada[;] ... [and] N.
Make any recommendation and do all things necessary and
proper to carry out the powers conferred upon the Commission
by this compact, provided that no action of the Commission shall
have the force of law in, or be binding upon, any party state.
Id. at art. VI (C), (H)-(J) & (N).
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These powers demonstrate why the Commission is not able to manage the
algal bloom crisis. The Commission's role is purely supportive and has no
enforcement powers to bind member states and provinces to more stringent
phosphorus pollution standards8 2 Therefore, national governmental
institutions bear the responsibility in creating and implementing
environmental policies that can fight HABs.
2. The Federal Environmental Protection Agency Is a Major
Actor in Implementing Policies Designed to Maintain and
Improve the Great Lakes 'Ecology
The United States Congress established the EPA "on December 2,
1970 to consolidate in one agency a variety of federal research, monitoring,
standard-setting and enforcement activities to ensure environmental
protection."8 3 Congress created the EPA in the wake of various
environmental disasters in the 1960s and 1970s, such as "oil spills, lake
fires" and concerns about toxic chemicals.84 The EPA implements various
programs to revitalize the Great Lakes and fight against HABs. 85
Unlike the Great Lakes Commission, the EPA has the authority to
issue, implement and revise environmental policies needed to successfully
complete the goals set by Congress. 6 Specifically, the EPA is empowered
to: 1) establish and enforce environmental protection standards; 2) conduct
research on the effects of pollution and on the methods and equipment for
controlling it; 3) assist others through grants and technical assistance to
fight against pollution; and 4) advise the President and develop new
policies.87
In comparison to state authorities, the EPA has jurisdiction over
particular environmental issues with the whole of the United States.8 8 This
makes it well suited to dealing with phosphorus loading into the Great
Lakes because many separate states and Canadian provinces contribute to
phosphorus loading into the Great Lakes. 89 Given the number of political
subdivisions that contribute phosphorus into the Great Lakes and the
82 See generally id. at art. VI.
83 Final Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 26,721-01 § 1.3 (1985); EPA History, EPA,
http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-history (last updated Mar. 12, 2014).
84 Erin L. Gordon, History of the Modem Environmental Movement in America,
AM. CENTER BULL., June 2012, at 1.
85 See generally Great Lakes Legacy Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
365, 122 Stat. 4021; GREAT LAKES RESTORATION INITIATIVE,
http://greatlakesrestoration.us/index.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).86 See generally Our Mission and What We Do, EPA (Mar. 16, 2014)
http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do.
87 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (1970), reprinted as
amended in 97 Stat. 485, 486 (1983).88 See generally Our Mission and What We Do, supra note 81.
89 PHOSPHORUS REDUCTION TASK FORCE, supra note 23, at 23.
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sweeping jurisdiction of the agency, the EPA is probably the most effective
institutional actor for managing the HAB crisis in the Great Lakes.
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE ALGAL BLOOM CRISIS FOR LOCAL
BUSINESSES
A. History of the Clean Water Act
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 (FWPCA) was
the first federal attempt at creating a comprehensive framework by which
the federal government could work with state governments to improve the
ecological health of the nation's water supply.90 The FWPCA provided
states with technical expertise and funding to combat locally identified
water pollution problems. 9' However, the FWPCA did not create federal
standards for water quality, instead leaving the creation of water quality
standards to be set by state governments.92
The law proved to be ineffective at improving the nation's water
quality. Given the patchwork of different water quality standards, different
levels of willingness by state officials to pursue enforcement and the
increase in environmental awareness in the 1960s and 1970s, Congress
enacted the 1972 amendment that became known as the Clean Water Act
(the Act or CWA).93 The CWA is, however, just one of many legislative
attempts at reining in pollution in the nation's waterways. 94 As the table
below shows, attempts at improving the environmental health of the
nation's waterways included six separate pieces of legislation before
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act of 1972. 9"
90 CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV., CLEAN WATER ACT: A
SUMMARY OF THE LAW 2 (2010).
91 Id.
92 id.
93 id.94 Id. at 1 tbl. 1.
95 Id.
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Federal Water Pollution Control Act and Related Amendments
1948-198796
Ye Act Public L-
1948 Federtl Wte Po*.lon CotI Act PI. 80-845(Act of J-.n 30."1948)
1956 Wter Polluoon CotroI At f 1956 RL 8464A0(Att of JIy 9. 1956)
1961 Fa drcl Water Potio. Co-tr Aa A rtt.od o P.L. 87-88
19&3 Watt" Quaity Act of 1965 PA. 89-234
1966 Clean War Restoraton Act P.Lt 89.753
1970 Waltc- Quaifty Improrn- - Act of 1970 P.L- 91-224. P- I
1972 FLdl Water Poflulon Con,-ol Act A.- mn-ts P.L. 92-500
1977 Ct-n Watr At of 1977 P.L. 95-217
1981 Mnicipal Wasttvoat- r Tm-atoc. Corftr-wcon Grants Amendents P.L. 97-117
1987 Wate Q-a1cy Act of 1987 P.L. 100-4
Congress passed the CWA in 1972 "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 97 In
addition, the Act specifies multiple other goals, policies.98 The following
are significant: (1) eliminating water pollution; (2) attaining fishable
waters; (3) prohibiting toxic pollutants in toxic amounts; (4) providing
federal grants; (5) encouraging public participation; (6) performing research
and development to attain zero discharge; and (7) controlling non-point
sources.
99
The Act envisions sources of pollution into bodies of navigable
water being one of two types: point and non-point sources. 00 The federal
government has jurisdiction to regulate point-source pollution under the
Act,101 whereas state governments are given jurisdiction to enforce any non-
point sources they deem to pose a risk of pollution to navigable waters. 1
2
Point sources are defined in the Act as:
[A]ny discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,
including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel,
tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling
stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or
other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be
discharged. This term does not include agricultural
96 id.
97 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (2012).
98 id.
99 Id.100 Jan G. Laitos & Heidi Ruckriegle, The Clean Water Act and the Challenge of
Aricultural Pollution, 37 VT. L. REv. 1033, 1035 (2013).
Id. (noting that "the CWA mandates that point source pollution be regulated
pursuant to federally-imposed, technology-based controls").
' 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b); see also Laitos & Ruckriegle, supra note 100, at 1034
("For such nonpoint sources, the Act in effect removes these sources from federal
oversight and instead delegates regulation and control of these sources to each
state.").
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stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated
agriculture.103
The statute places agricultural runoff outside federal jurisdiction to
enforce discharge regulation, and it makes state governments responsible
for creating regulations for non-point-source agricultural runoff.10 4 This
severely limits the federal government's ability to fight against HABs
because such a large amount of phosphorus comes from non-point-source
pollution (see table below for Lake Erie as an example). Pursuant to a 1987
amendment to the CWA, state authorities may implement regulations
designed to manage non-point-source pollution to achieve the goals of the
CWA. 10 5 If a state has passed a non-point-source pollution regulation on
agricultural runoff, however, then the CWA might provide a means by
which private citizens may seek injunctive relief from property owners who
pollute bodies of water with agricultural runoff..
10 6
Sources of Phosphorus Entering Lake Erie
1998-2005107
No, pornt
Poin~t
Oppa hakes
522
1,051
1,080
3,987
388
0
1,094
469
0
5,604
1,08
20,75%
11 H%
60oshr g 546 626 6 6%
Totl 2,b'3 4,455 2,111 9220 100
Ier emt of total 29% 4% 23% 100%
B. Private Rights ofAction Under the Clean Water Act
The CWA provides a private right of action for citizens to sue
violators of effluent standards for either injunctive relief or civil
penalties.108 The CWA envisioned agricultural runoff and other non-point-
source pollution to be managed by the states with federal assistance. 1°9 For
non-point-source pollution, such as agricultural runoff, a would-be plaintiff
would need a state law or regulation designed to regulate the use of
fertilizers that runoff into navigable bodies of water. Once a state law has
103 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (emphasis added).
104 Laitos & Ruckriegle, supra note 100, at 1034.
105 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b).
106 Id § 1365(a).
107 OHIO ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 35, at 18 tbl. 1.
108 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
109 Hiebenthal v. Meduri Farms, 242 F. Supp. 2d 885, 888 (D. Or. 2002); The Clean
Water Act: Protecting and Restoring our Nation's Waters, EPA,
http://water.epa.gov/action/cleanwater40/cwal0l.cfin (last visited Apr. 17, 2014).
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been put in place and is violated, then a plaintiff might be able to bring suit
against the violator under the CWA. Over the years, federal courts have
developed a long line of case law interpreting the private right of action and
who may sue, what kind of violations create an injury and what limitations
there are on potential plaintiffs from suing.
1. Courts Apply Relatively Liberal Standards for Whom and
Under What Conditions a Party May Sue for an Injury
Caused by a Non-point-source Polluter
To prevail at trial, a plaintiff must prove an ongoing violation."l0 In
order to show an ongoing violation, a plaintiff must show either (1) the
violations "continue on or after the [time] the complaint is filed" in court
against the violator, or (2) evidence would make a reasonable trier of fact
find a likelihood that the violator will resume the conduct "in intermittent or
sporadic violations" in the future."'
The private right of action belongs to private citizens in the
statute. 12 However, this right of action also belongs to organizations, if
their land has been adversely affected by polluting activities."13 In New
Manchester Resort & Golf a corporate owner of undeveloped property
filed suit against two owners of adjacent property, alleging that storm water
discharges and the presence of fill material in the stream that passed
through the resort's land violated the CWA and asserted various state law
claims. 114 The district court found that corporate entities that owned
property that was adversely affected by another landowner's polluting use
of their property may bring a claim under the CWA. "'
Organizations may sue under the CWA's private right of action in a
representative capacity, as well. 16 An organization wishing to sue on behalf
110 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 50
1987).
' Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 853 F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal
quotations omitted).33 U.S.C. § 1365(a); see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326,
1334 (2013).113 New Manchester Resort & Golf, LLC v. Douglasville Dev., LLC, 734 F. Supp.
2d 1326, 1332 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (finding corporate owner of property that was
directly affected by defendants' discharges did not need to show that its individual
shareholders had standing).14Id. at 1330.
"'
5 Id. at 1331-32.
116 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 629 F.3d 387,
396-97 (4th Cir. 2011).
An organization may have standing to sue based on an injury to
the organization itself or as a representative of its harmed
members. To have representational standing, as asserted by the
plaintiffs in this case, an organization must show that one of its
members would have standing to sue in his or her own right.
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of one of its members must satisfy certain criteria. First, one of its members
must have standing in their own right to sue.1 17 Also, the interests must be
germane to the organization's purpose. 1 8 Finally, neither the claim asserted
nor the relief sought requires members of the organization to participate in
the suit." 9 In Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., Friends of the Earth-a non-
profit environmental advocacy organization-filed suit under the CWA
against the operator of a smelting facility, alleging violations of the
operator's permit and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 20 The court
found that an organization that wishes to sue on behalf of members must
simply satisfy traditional standing requirements.
To [satisfy] the ... requirement[s] for standing, a plaintiff
must prove that: 1) he or she suffered an "injury in fact"
that is concrete and particularized, and is actual or
imminent; 2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant; and 3) the injury likely will be
redressed by a favorable decision.
121
Thankfully for Great Lakes businesses that suffer impairment to
their property, federal courts have liberally evaluated organizations'
standing to bring suit against polluters. In Idaho Conservation League v.
Atlanta Gold Corp., environmental organizations sued a mining
corporation, seeking an injunction, declaratory relief and civil penalties
under the CWA for the corporation's discharge of water from a mine.122 In
satisfying the showing of an injury suffered, even an aesthetic alteration to
the used property caused by the pollution can suffice. 123 Furthermore,
impairment of navigable bodies of water for purposes of recreation also
satisfies the injury requirement. 124 In Idaho Conservation League,
Id. (citations omitted).
"' Id. at 397.
118 Idaho Conservation League v. Atlanta Gold Corp., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1128
fO. Idaho 2012).
19 Id
120 Friends of the Earth, Inc., 629 F.3d at 391-92.
121 Id. at 396 (internal citation omitted) (finding plaintiff who meets the standing
requirements of Article III of the Constitution also satisfies the CWA"s statutory
threshold).
122 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1120-21.
[A] plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an 'injury in fact' that
is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed
to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.
Id. at 1128.
123 Id. ("Environmental citizen suit plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when
they aver that they use an affected area, and that the aesthetic and recreational
values of that area will be lessened by the challenged activity.").
124 Friends of the Earth, Inc., 629 F.3d at 397; Idaho Conservation League, 844 F.
Supp. 2d at 1128-29; George v. Reisdorf Bros., 696 F. Supp. 2d 333, 337
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organizations' members used a river for hiking, canoeing, fishing,
swimming and camping, which were impaired by the polluting activities of
the defendant corporation.
125
Other courts have held that even a reasonable danger of harm posed
by the discharge can satisfy the injury requirement for standing.126 In
PennEnvironment v. RRI Energy Northeast Management Co.,
organizations' members expressed concern that pollution would impair
their ability to use river for paddling, swimming, fishing and bird
watching. 27 George v. Reisdorf Bros., Inc. is another example of a case in
which impairment of recreational use of navigable bodies of water satisfies
the injury requirement. 128 In that case, Plaintiffs' alleged inability to
consume fish caught in a creek as a result of pollutants discharged by
Defendant was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to standing.
129
The right of action may also be exercised by a plaintiff even if
federal or state environmental agencies have refused or declined to bring
charges. 130 Courts, however, give deference to government agencies
bringing charges against violators compared to citizen plaintiffs bringing
Suit.1 31 This is because citizen suits are meant to "supplement" government
enforcement of environmental regulations and "not [to] supplant" such
enforcement. 32 Courts will also not dismiss suits against defendants
because government environmental agencies are not necessary parties to a
citizen suit for violations of the CWA. 133 Also, the fact that the alleged
conduct in question might involve another federal regulation that does not
(W.D.N.Y. 2010); PennEnvironment v. RRI Energy Ne. Mgmt. Co., 744 F. Supp.
2d 466, 478-79 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
125 Idaho Conservation League, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1128-29.
12 6 See, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Hobet Mining, LLC, 723 F. Supp. 2d
886, 903 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (finding that plaintiffs satisfied the traceability
requirement for standing where the discharge of the selenium at issue would be
reasonably expected to cause some members of plaintiff group to curtail their use
of the body of water, thus diminishing their enjoyment of the area, and where
plaintiffs reasonably feared selenium discharges may result in harm to themselves
and area wildlife).127 774 F. Supp. 2d at 477-79.
128 696 F. Supp. 2d at 333.
129 Id. at 337.
130 Envtl. Conservation Org. v. City of Dallas, 529 F.3d 519, 526 (5th Cir. 2008)
(finding that inaction by government environmental agencies does not preclude a
citizen from bring suit).
131 See Ass'n to Protect Hammersley v. Taylor Res., Inc., 299 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th
Cir. 2002).
132 Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Mirant Lovett, LLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d 337, 343, 344
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("'Citizen suits play an important role in the Act's enforcement
scheme,' and '[t]he citizen suit provisions were designed not only to 'motivate
government agencies' to take action.., but also to make citizens partners in the
enforcement of the Act's provisions."') (citing Weiler v. Chatham Forest Prods.
Inc., 392 F.3d 532, 536 (2d Cir. 2004)).133 See id.
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give plaintiffs a private right of action does not make government agencies
necessary parties.1
34
2. Limitations on the Private Right ofAction Under the Clean
Water Act Restrict Who Can Be Sued, When a Plaintiff May
Sue and What They Can Receive in Relief
The private right of action in the CWA serves as a means for
citizens to serve the public when the government neglects its duty to
prosecute violations of effluent standards (whether state or federal). 3 '
However, citizen suits are designed to supplement-not to supplant-
federal regulation of pollution in the nation's water.' 36 Therefore, courts
have limited citizens suits that seek monetary damages from government
actors based on sovereign immunity. 37 In addition, citizen suits cannot
occur when a government actor has already brought charges against the
violator for the same conduct. 1
38
Citizen suits may not seek monetary compensation from
government agencies for failing to prosecute a violator.' 39 The private right
of action does not circumvent a state actor's right to sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. 40 Given
this limitation, any plaintiffs wishing to seek compensation from the
government should instead seek damages against the original violator.
Plaintiffs must also provide the violator with adequate notice of
their polluting conduct in order to bring formal charges.' 4' A plaintiff must
give the alleged violator, the EPA and the state sixty-days notice of their
intent to sue after the violation took place. 42 Failing to provide such notice
to all potential parties will result in dismissal. 43 Other than making the
alleged violator aware of a possible lawsuit, this notice requirement acts to
inform a potentially unaware environmental government agency of the
violation.144 The notice requirement reflects the policy preference that suits
against violators be carried out by government agencies rather than being
134 Or. State Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc. v. Pac. Coast Seafoods Co., 341 F.
Supp. 2d 1170, 1179 (D. Or. 2004).
136 See Sw. Marine, Inc. v. United States, 535 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 2008).
136 Sierra Club v. ICG E., LLC, 833 F. Supp. 2d 571, 575 (N.D. W. Va. 2011).
'3 See, e.g., Murtaugh v. New York, 810 F. Supp. 2d 446 (N.D.N.Y. 2011).13'33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (2012).
139 Murtaugh, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 470 (finding the plaintiffs unable to seek civil
penalties against the commissioner of state environmental agency for failure to
bring charges against an alleged polluter).
140 id.
14 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A).
142 id.
143 Vandermark v. City of New York, 615 F. Supp. 2d 196, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
144 Id.
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supplanted by citizen suits.1 45 Also, in the interest of judicial economy,
requiring sufficient notice gives the alleged violator time to correct their
polluting activities, thus making a lawsuit unnecessary.
146
If the federal or state environmental agencies have failed to bring
charges against the alleged violator within sixty days of the plaintiff giving
notice, then a citizen plaintiff may formally file a complaint against the
alleged violator. 147 Once a government environmental agency has
commenced action against the alleged violator for the originally claimed
violation, then the private citizen is deprived of his right to bring suit
against the violator for the same violation(s). 1
48
There is a circuit split over what qualifies as "commencement of
action." The Fourth Circuit merely requires that the government initiate an
investigation to fulfill commencement of action, while the Fifth Circuit
requires more formal steps to be taken.149 Such formal steps would require
that "commencement of action" be that the government has prosecuted the
matter to the point where it can bring the violator into compliance with the
CWA. 1 ° A would-be citizen plaintiff cannot challenge a governmental
prosecution of an alleged violator easily. The decision to use different
strategies in prosecuting violators, such as less-demanding fines or the
specifics of a plea agreement are not sufficient to show that the government
agency has failed to adequately prosecute the alleged violator.'5 '
3. Jurisdictional and Evidentiary Concerns Limit the
Availability of the Private Right ofAction to Would-be
Plaintiffs
The availability of the private right of action is potentially limited
by jurisdictional requirements and evidentiary standards. Federal courts
have subject matter jurisdiction to hear cases based on federal question
145 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 59-
60 (1987) ("Citizen-plaintiffs must give notice to the alleged violator, the
Administrator of EPA, and the State in which the alleged violation 'occurs.' . . . It
follows logically that the purpose of notice to the alleged violator is to give it an
opportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the Act and thus likewise
render unnecessary a citizen suit.").146 id.
14' 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B).148 id.
149 Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. Carroll Cnty., Md., 523 F.3d 453, 460 (4th Cir. 2008);
see also La. Envtl. Action Network v. Sun Drilling Prods. Corp., 716 F. Supp. 2d
476, 480-81 (E.D. La. 2010) (finding that sending warning letters was insufficient
to be a formal step against alleged violator to bring them into compliance with
CWA).
150 La. Envtl. Action Network, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 480-81.
151 See Karr v. Hefner, 475 F.3d 1192, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2007).
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jurisdiction, 152 diversity jurisdiction' 53 and supplemental jurisdiction. 54 A
plaintiff whose claims do not satisfy one of these three types of jurisdictions
cannot have his claims heard in federal court. Since state non-point-source
pollution standards are not federal statutes, it is questionable whether a
plaintiff could bring his claims under federal question jurisdiction. A
plaintiff might be able to bring his suit based on diversity jurisdiction and
supplemental jurisdiction, but it would depend on the particulars of each
plaintiff's case.
Possible evidentiary concerns also limit the use of the private right
of action by plaintiffs. Currently, it is difficult to know exactly how much
phosphorus makes its way into the Great Lakes from agricultural sources.'55
Therefore, it would be almost impossible with current technology to
pinpoint how much a particular actor has contributed to intensifying HABs.
This limitation would make it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to show
cause and would likely result in dismissal.
C. Lobbying by Great Lakes Businesses as a Means to Combat the
Issue of HABs
Lobbying is a non-exclusive alternative strategy for Great Lakes
businesses to protect their interests in an environmentally healthy Great
Lakes. Businesses adversely affected by polluting activities can utilize
lobbying to motivate elected representatives to pass favorable laws and
regulations to curb such activities. Lobbying offers a longer-term strategy
to deal with the HABs crisis in the Great Lakes and avoids many of the
problems associated with litigating under the CWA's private right of action.
1. What is Lobbying?
The use of lobbying is seen as an integral part of the American
system of democratic government. 5 6 Lobbying is protected under the First
152 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
"' Id. § 1332 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and is between-- (1) citizens of different States.").
154 Id § 1367(a) ("Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district
courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.").
' OHIO ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 35, at 43.
156 Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This "Lobbying" That We Are So Worried
About?, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 485, 486 (2008) ("Lobbying has a prominent
and positive place in our laws and our history. It is protected by the First
Amendment right to petition the government for redress and by similar provisions
in numerous state constitutions.").
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Amendment as an exercise of free speech in order to petition the
government to act.157 Furthermore, lobbying provides policyrnakers with
relevant information on issues that warrant government action. 58 Informing
the public about issues of regional or national concern is another benefit
that lobbying creates in the American democratic system of governance.
1 59
Multiple definitions of what legally constitutes lobbying exist. The
definition most relevant for the purposes of Great Lakes businesses is found
in the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA).160 The LDA covers
communications between registered lobbyists seeking to influence a
government official.' 6' Furthermore, the LDA regulates communications to
two types of government officials, "'covered executive branch officials'
and 'covered legislative branch officials."",162 Communications with
government officials who fall into one of these two categories are covered
by the LDA if the communications involve legislation, regulation,
executive branch action, a federal program or policy or the nomination or
confirmation of a person for a position subject to confirmation by the
Senate. 63 Covered legislative officials include any member, officer or
employee of the United States Congress.' 64 "Covered executive branch
officials include the President, Vice President, . . . [and] any officer or
employee in Executive Schedule levels I through V.'
165
2. Lobbying Has Been an Effective Tool Used by
Environmentalist Groups to Promote Ecological
Responsibility and Can Be Just as Effective if Used by Great
Lakes Businesses Affected by HABs
The current environmental protection regime would not likely have
been possible without lobbying by environmentalist organizations. The rise
of the environmentalist movement in America coincided with many federal
government programs designed to protect the environment. 166 The United
States slowly centralized environmental regulation authority from state and
157 id.
158 Id. ("Lobbyists and the groups they represent often bring useful information to
policymakers and facilitate public participation in, and knowledge about,
P9vemment decision making.").Id.
160 Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, §§ 3(7), (8), 109 Stat.
691, 692 (1995).
161 Id. § 3(8).162 id.
163 id.
'64 Id. § 3(4).165 Mayer, supra note 156, at 511-12.
166 See generally Seventies 1970-79, ENVTL. HIST. TIMELINE,
http://66.147.244.135/-enviror4/20th-century/seventies- 1970-79/ (last visited Apr.
10,2014).
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local governments to the federal government. 167 In 1970, President Richard
Nixon proposed the creation of the EPA in order to create and enforce
uniform environmental standards throughout the United States. 168 The EPA
was the combination of fifteen key federal programs, "including the ...
National Air Pollution Control Administration (NAPCA) and the... Water
Quality Administration (FWQA).' 69
The year 1972 saw some of the greatest legislative successes the
environmental movement has ever achieved. Congress passed four
landmark acts that greatly increased the federal government's role in
environmental protection. First, Congress passed the CWA to "restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters. '" 7 Congress's desire to pass the CWA was so strong that it passed
the law over Nixon's veto. 171 Also, Congress passed the Coastal Zone
Management Act (CZMA).172 The CZMA sets out a management
framework for the nation's coastal resources and balances economic and
environmental concerns. 173 Furthermore, the Marine Mammal Protection
Act (MMPA) was passed by Congress to prohibit the taking (i.e., hunting,
killing, capture and/or harassment) of marine mammals and imposes a
moratorium on the import, export and sale of marine mammal products.
174
Lastly, Congress passed the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA) in 1972, authorizing the EPA to regulate the use and sale of
pesticides to protect human health and preserve the environment.7 5
Specifically, FIFRA gave the EPA the ability to "(1) strengthen the
registration process by shifting the burden of proof to the chemical
manufacturer, (2) enforce compliance against banned and unregistered
products[] and (3) promulgate the regulatory framework.' 76
What this history shows is that legislators clearly respond to
agitation for environmental protection and that lobbying is a powerful tool
to this end. Great Lakes businesses adversely affected by HABs could find
it advantageous to join with environmentalist groups to lobby elected
representatives to tighten fertilizer runoff standards. Lobbying as a strategy
167 Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching
Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 24 (1996).
168 Seventies 1970-79, supra note 166.
169 id.
170 33 U.S.C. § 125 l(a) (2012) (quoted in Laitos & Ruckriegle, supra note 100, at
1033).
171 See Seventies 1970-79, supra note 166.
172 id.
173 See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64.174 1d. §§ 1361, 1371.
175 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/lfra.html (last updated June 27, 2012). See
generally 7 U.S.C. § 136.Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), supra note 175.
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would allow business leaders and environmental organizations to pool
resources to bring additional pressure on representatives, thus increasing the
likelihood of desired changes in environmental law and regulation.
While businesses and environmentalist groups are traditionally seen
at odds with one another,'77 this is not always the case. Some businesses
find it advantageous to join forces with environmentalist advocacy
organizations because it suits their commercial interests. 178 This alignment
of interests can happen when regulations limit a company's competition,
subsidize a company's delivery of goods and/or services or put burdens on
a company's competitors, but not on them (i.e. a nuclear energy company
would find it advantageous if competing coal companies are burdened with
additional regulations, but those regulations only relate to coal companies
and not nuclear). 79 Therefore, Great Lakes businesses in industries such as
fishing and tourism should be willing partners with environmental groups in
pursuing tighter controls on fertilizer runoff that cause HABs. However,
lobbying is a tool that can be used by groups opposed to tighter restrictions
as well.
3. Agribusinesses Pose a Large and Powerful Counterweight
to Any Attempts by Great Lakes Businesses to Lobby for
Tighter Restrictions on Fertilizer Runoff
The term agribusiness does not have a single definition; some
definitions of agribusiness act "as a catch-all term for the entire agricultural
sector of the economy."' 80 For the purposes of this paper, the term
agribusiness means "agricultural production carried out at a large scale.''
Furthermore, agricultural production includes not just the raising of crops
and livestock, but also the processing of raw materials into final goods.
177 See, e.g., Environment, GALLUP,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1615/environment.aspx (last updated Apr. 10, 2014,
4:15 PM) (providing empirical evidence showing dissatisfaction with
environmental regulation).
178 Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists-the Education of a Regulatory
Economist, AEI J. ON GOv'T & SOC'Y 12, 14 (1983) (describing this synthesis of
interests between commercial and regulatory actors as "Regulation is relief for
some and a burden for others, so that reform is a burden for some and a relief for
others.").
"9 See id at 13-14.
180 TRAvis MADSEN ET AL., ENV'T AM. RESEARCH & POLICY CTR., GROWING
INFLUENCE: THE POLITICAL POWER OF AGRIBUSINESS AND THE FOULING OF
AMERICA'S WATERWAYS 36 n.1 (2011).
181 Id. ("There are many potential definitions of 'agribusiness.' The term is
sometimes used as a generic description for business-oriented farms, or as a catch-
all term for the entire agriculture sector of the economy, including businesses that
manufacture or supply products used on farms.").
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Finally, "large-scale is inherently a subjective term," but in this paper it
refers to industrial-sized agricultural operations.
82
Agribusinesses are one of the most powerful groups in American
politics. 8 3 Between 2000 and 2010, ten agribusiness companies and groups
spent a total of $35 million on campaign contributions to Congressional
campaigns.184 Additionally, agribusinesses contributed $120 million to
state-level political campaigns for office. 85 These contributions allow
agribusiness to greatly influence elected representatives and how they vote.
By far the largest group lobbying on behalf of agribusinesses is the
American Farm Bureau Federation,' 86 which spent roughly forty-five
percent of the total political contributions over ten years. 87 Many other
large agribusinesses spent large sums of money. American Crystal Sugar is
the second largest contributor with roughly twenty-one percent of the
total. 88 American Crystal Sugar is the largest sugar beet processor and
operates large sugar processing facilities in the Midwest that have been
accused of violating the CWA.189 Dean Foods-America's largest dairy
producer-is the third-largest contributor to Congressional candidates, with
seven percent of the total.' 90
Political campaign contributions are not the only way
agribusinesses influence the legislative process. Agribusiness as a whole
spends large amounts of money on lobbying efforts to communicate their
views on legislation to elected representatives and regulatory officials.' 9'
The objective of this large-scale lobbying by agribusiness is done not just to
communicate their views, but also to increase the chances that elected
representatives and regulatory officials implement policies favorable to the
industry. According to lobbying disclosure forms, water pollution is one of
182 id.
'
83 Id. at 4.
184 Id. at 5 ("To amass power, big agribusiness has long made campaign
contributions to lawmakers who play key roles in the regulation of agricultural
practices.").
186 id.
The American Farm Bureau Federation, along with state and
county Farm Bureaus, are among the most powerful lobbying
organizations in America. The Farm Bureau touts itself as the
'voice of agriculture.' But the organization's sources of funding
and agenda have led many - including some farmers - to suggest
that the Farm Bureau puts the needs of corporate agribusiness
above the needs of the small farmers.
Id. at20.181 See id. at 5.188 id.
189 Id. at 16.
190 Id. at 5.
'9' Id. at 18.
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the highest priority issues for agribusinesses.192 For example, the American
Farm Bureau employed more lobbyists on water issues in 2010 than on any
other issue. 93 The agenda of these water issue lobbyists ranged from the
scope of the CWA, regulation of pesticides and regulations covering
pollution originating from factory farms.
194
The amount of resources that agribusinesses commit to lobbying is
staggering compared to the relatively modest lobbying expenditures of
environmental groups. Between 2005 and 2010, ten agribusinesses spent
$126.9 million on lobbying the United States Congress and related
regulatory agencies. 195 Also, agribusinesses fielded 159 lobbyists in 2010-
roughly one lobbyist for every four members of Congress. 1
96
A quick glance at the lobbying expenditures between agribusiness
and environmental causes shows how stark the gap is in resources. In 1998,
agribusinesses spent $120 million on lobbying while environmental groups
spent roughly $5 million, or approximate four percent. 197 In 2005,
agribusinesses spent just over $100 million on lobbying compared to
environmental groups' nearly $5 million, or twenty times the amount. 198
Even in 2009, when environmental groups spent the most on lobbying, it
was only a fraction of what agribusinesses spent that year (roughly eighteen
percent). 99 What these numbers show is that agribusinesses repeatedly out-
spend environmental groups by many more times. With so much spending
on lobbying, the question becomes what exactly is the payoff for
agribusinesses.
200
192 id.
193 id.
194 id.
195 id.
19 6 Id.
197 Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Agribusiness: Lobbying, 2008, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/lobbying.php?cycle=2008&ind=A
[hereinafter Agribusiness] (last visited Apr. 11, 2014); Ctr. for Responsive Politics,
Environment: Lobbying, 2013, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
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A question these statistics raise is what effect, if any, does spending
more on lobbying have for agribusinesses? In a study examining the rate of
return for companies lobbying for a tax exemption to repatriated profits
abroad, the ratio between expenditures on lobbying and economic benefit to
the companies involved was 1:220.203 This means that for every dollar
expended on lobbying activities, a company in the study received on
2°lEnvironment, supra note 197.
202 Agribusiness, supra note 197.
203 Raquel Alexander et al., Measuring Rates of Return on Lobbying Expenditures:
An Empirical Case Study of Tax Breaks for Multinational Corporations, 25 J.L. &
POL. 401, 444 (2009).
The 220:1 ratio, combined with our analysis showing that most
of the tax benefits were concentrated among a fairly small group
of corporations and an even smaller number of industries, may
lead observers to declare that our study has finally confirmed
what commentators, lawmakers, and other researchers have
perceived so for many years: that narrow, well-financed interest
groups, through their lobbying activities, have a powerful
influence on legislative outcomes.
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average $220 in return.2 While the study's results are specific to lobbying
for tax benefits,20 5 the study shows that companies are willing to spend
large sums of money on lobbying because of a possibly large economic
benefit to be gained.
Agribusinesses also likely benefit from lobbying more than many
other forms of businesses. According to Raquel Alexander, corporations
benefit most from lobbying when there is a limited number of actors with
shared interests and concentrated benefits.206 Indeed, it is not even
necessary that each lobbying corporation be engaged in the specific
industry to benefit greatly from lobbying. What seems necessary is that all
the businesses be unified by a shared objective. 0 7 What this means in the
context of agribusiness lobbying is that a large corn producer and a large
soybean producer will spend large sums of money on relatively few pieces
of legislation and that they should expect a bigger return on their
investment compared to a small family farm.
Lobbying offers Great Lakes businesses an avenue other than
litigation to protect their commercial interests in an ecologically healthy
Great Lakes. Litigation suffers from being expensive, uncertain and
potentially ineffective at reining in all polluters of the Great Lakes.
Lobbying offers a less expensive and more comprehensive way of reducing
pollution into the Great Lakes. With the successful passage of a bill in
Congress, fertilizer standards can be set, clean-up programs can be made
and all potential polluters would be under the standard.
However, lobbying is not an easy route to take for Great Lakes
businesses. Agribusiness is a large and powerful opponent of ratcheting up
any environmental regulation of the fertilizer runoff. Great Lakes
businesses will have to throw their resources and lobbying efforts in with
environmental groups if lobbying is to be a viable strategy. If successful,
however, lobbying offers the most comprehensive and long-term strategy
Great Lakes businesses can use to ensure the ecological health of one of
this country's greatest natural resources.
D. Litigation or Lobbying as a Solution for Great Lakes Businesses
in Response to HABs
Litigation and lobbying each have their own strengths and
weaknesses as strategies for regional businesses to promote their interest in
204 id.
205 See id.
216 Id. at 446 ("The group of corporations lobbying for the deduction for repatriated
earnings in section 965 possessed the two characteristics identified by Olson as
determinants of interest group formation: a limited number of actors with shared
interests and concentrated benefits.").
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an ecologically healthy Great Lakes. Litigation is a good strategy if only a
few violators are causing the damage to a business's property by
discharging runoff. Furthermore, a suit may be able to bring the polluter
into a favorable settlement agreement within a reasonable amount of time.
However, litigation is expensive and is uncertain to produce a favorable
result to the injured business. Furthermore, procedural and evidentiary
issues might limit the availability of the private right of action under the
CWA.
Lobbying is likely to be less expensive than litigation and it could
produce a new regulation that would bind all actively and potential
polluters from discharging fertilizer runoff. Counterlobbying by
agribusinesses poses a large challenge to Great Lakes businesses, however,
given the sheer scale of their lobbying resources. The scale of lobbying
expenditures is likely to result in an economic boon for the small number of
wealthy agribusiness corporations that benefit from the current set of laws
governing fertilizer runoff.
The best strategy for adversely affected Great Lakes businesses is
to use lobbying first and foremost, since it offers an inexpensive and more
comprehensive solution relative to litigation. However, the most effective
strategy might be for some businesses to utilize both litigation and
lobbying. Whether a business's interests are better served by focusing
exclusively on litigation or lobbying, or some mixture of both, will depend
on a number of factors. In the long run, lobbying offers the best hope of
bringing about comprehensive reform of how agricultural runoff is
managed to reduce the threat posed by HABs to Great Lakes businesses.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Great Lakes are perhaps this country's greatest natural
resource. They are the largest source of fresh water in the world and they
facilitate one of the largest economic regions. Many states rely on the Great
Lakes for their economic health. Industries such as fishing, water,
manufacturing, energy and tourism all rely to differing degrees on an
ecologically healthy Great Lakes. The presence of HABs has been shown
in case studies to damage various industries and cost society in the tens of
millions of dollars annually. The growth in HABs is mostly due to the
discharge of fertilizer runoff containing phosphorus. In order to stem the
growth of HABs, discharges of fertilizer runoff containing phosphorus must
be sharply reduced.
One solution available to Great Lakes businesses adversely affected
by HABs is to sue polluters under the CWA. The CWA provides for a
private right of action to sue a polluter who violates a federal or state
discharge standard. Since agricultural runoff is listed as non-point-source
pollution, it is up to state-level representatives to implement fertilizer runoff
standards to achieve the goals of the CWA. Once a standard has been
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passed, Great Lakes businesses may sue if these limits are exceeded by a
user of fertilizer containing phosphorus.
Lobbying is another avenue available to Great Lakes businesses
that are adversely affected by HABs. Lobbying is the process by which
organizations petition elected representatives and regulatory officials to
consider their views on how an issue should be dealt with. Environmental
organizations have used lobbying in the past to successfully persuade
elected representatives to enact various environmental reforms and
regulations. There is no reason why Great Lakes businesses cannot also use
the lobbying process to persuade elected officials to implement reforms and
regulations that will reduce HABs.
This Note leaves open many questions that future researchers will
have to investigate before the true effectiveness of these two strategies can
be fully understood. First, this Note did not examine the kind of issues
arising under civil procedure and evidence law as to how a plaintiff might
sue a polluter under the CWA's private right of action. There is a possibility
that a plaintiff might not be able to bring suit in federal court without
diversity jurisdiction applying. Furthermore, evidentiary issues arise as to
how a plaintiff could prove that a particular agricultural polluter caused the
damage to the plaintiffs property. As to lobbying, more research will have
to be done into how much resources would be required to effectively
change legislative outcomes.

